This paper examines the impact of corporate governance and audit quality on risk taking in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry. The evidence shows that some corporate governance variables, as well as some audit quality variables are related to risk taking. We find that longer board tenure is associated with low underwriting risk. But the higher percentage of financial experts on the board is associated with high underwriting risk. The possible reason is that financial experts possess a deep understanding of a firm's financial situation and may encourage the management to take higher risk in anticipation of a higher return for a positive net present value project. The results are consistent with agency theory and wealth transfer hypothesis in that high risk taking is consistent with shareholder interest maximization. In addition, we find a non-monotonic relation between insider ownership and leverage risk. Finally, we do not find evidence that the Sarbanes-Oxley act have impact on the risk taking behavior.
Introduction
Risk-taking behavior of insurance companies is important to policyholders, stockholders, regulators, and other stakeholders.
The relation between corporate governance and risk taking has been studied in a wide range of industries (e.g., Anderson and Fraser, 2000; Belkhir, 2006; John et al., 2007 61 ; Laeven and Levine 2007 62 ; Sullivan and Spong, 2007). Little research has been conducted on the relation between corporate governance and risk taking in the property casualty insurance industry and no study examines the relation between audit quality and risktaking behavior. Our research questions are stated as follows. First, we are interested in whether there is any impact of corporate governance and audit quality on the risk-taking behavior of U.S. property casualty insurance companies. Second, we wonder whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has any impact on the risk taking behavior.
Excessive risk taking of an insurance company rewards stockholders at the expense of policyholders. Galai and Masulis (1976) point out that shareholder 61 John et al. (2007) use the Compustat global industries. 62 Laeven and Levine (2007) have discussed the bank industry.
with limited liability have incentive to take excessive risk to maximize corporate value at the expense of policyholders. The reason is that shareholders benefit 100% of upside potential after paying the fixed obligations (e.g., interest payments), but limit their liabilities by sharing losses with other stakeholders (e.g., debtholders). The arguments can be applied into insurance companies. For insurance companies, the conflict of interests between stockholders and policyholders cannot be ignored.
In particular, policyholders of insurance companies are risk adverse and relatively undiversified. 63 Corporate governance and proper auditing can mitigate the inappropriate excessive risk-taking behavior. The Public Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, hereafter, SOX) were signed into law on July 30, 2002 to protect stakeholders of corporations. According to this Act, all public companies are required to strengthen board independence, e.g., forming independent audit committees and assigning at least one financial expert to serve as the audit committee director.
We believe audit quality is also important to risktaking behavior. For example, the percentage of financial experts on the board can serve as a measure 63 Dionne (2000) P. 507. of audit quality. A company with a higher percentage of audit members on the board should provide higher audit quality.
In addition to examining the impact of corporate governance and audit quality on the risk-taking behaviors, we also examine whether there exists a significant change in risk-taking behaviors post-SOX.
Our sample consists of 36 public property casualty insurance companies from 2000 through 2004. The results show that board tenure is negatively associated with underwriting risk, but the percentage of financial experts on the board is positively associated with underwriting risk. Finally, we find there is a positive relation between leverage risk and insider ownership when insider ownership is in the range between 5 percent and 25 percent and a negative relation when insider ownership is beyond 25 percent. Examination of the impact of SOX shows that there is an increase in reinsurance ratio after the implementation of SOX.
Some contributions of this study are stated below. This study takes a comprehensive approach focusing on underwriting risk and leverage risk measures, while other studies use only one risk measure. Moreover, we find a non-monotonic relation between insider ownership and leverage risk. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to be conducted on the relations between corporate governance and audit quality variables on risk taking in the property casualty insurance industry.
Literature review and hypotheses
This section provides literature review. We first review the literature related to the relation between corporate governance and risk taking and then the relation between audit quality and risk taking. Finally, the literature related to SOX is discussed.
Relation between Corporate Governance and Risk Taking
It is important to review the literature related the factors that affect risk-taking behavior before we review the literature related to the relation between corporate governance and risk taking. It is well know that managers are agents of shareholders who should maximize shareholders' wealth. One possibility is that managers seek the risk taking activity desired by the stockholders at the expense of policyholders as mentioned above. Owner and manager, however, generally have differing risk preferences. Agency theory argues that managers may adopt actions based on their own interests rather than shareholders' interests (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Stiglitz, 1987) . Jensen and Murphy (1990) show when manager interests are aligned with those of the owner agency problems are reduced. For example, when manager and owner interests are aligned, if the owner prefers higher risk taking so will the manager (Downs and Sommer, 1999) . Corporate governance is one way to mitigate agency problems. If board directors are effective in controlling agency problems, they will ensure that the management maximizes shareholders' wealth. John et al. (2007) suggest that managers avoid taking risk for position concerns. They also find that better investor protection and more effective monitoring mitigate the conservative activities resulting in higher risk in value enhancing projects. Shareholders with limited liability have more incentive to transfer benefits from policyholders to shareholders. Hence, the agency problem impacts on corporate risk in terms of manager, shareholder and policyholder interests. In terms of corporate governance and risk taking, CEO duality, average tenure of directors and insider ownership variables are considered. The relation between insider ownership and risk taking in property casualty insurance has rarely been discussed. Thus, whether insider ownership impacts on corporate risk taking is an interesting question for the property casualty insurance industry.
Relation between Audit Quality and Risk Taking
This section focuses the relation between audit quality and risk taking. Reports on corporate governance stress the importance of board committees such as audit, compensation and nomination committees as additional monitoring controls. According to the objective of Section 404 of SOX, corporate management should focus on the internal controls that best protect against the risk of a material financial misstatement. Section 404 provides for meaningful disclosure to investors about the effectiveness of a company's internal controls systems without creating unnecessary compliance burdens or wasting shareholder resources.
64
A number of studies have looked at this issue related to the relation between audit quality and risk taking. Some studies show a negative relation (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Simunic and Stein, 1987; Beatty, 1989 ) and others show a positive relation (e.g., Asthana et al., 2004; Knechel and Willekens, 2006; Bratton, 2007) . None of the study that we are aware of examines the relation in the U.S. property casualty insurance industry.
Impact of SOX on Risk Taking
We next review the literature related to the impact on SOX. Boyle and Grace-Webb (2008) suggest that SOX has greater costs of auditing and less corporate investment and risk-taking. Litvak (2007) also finds firms take less risk after the SOX Act especially for high-growth and better governance firms. In addition, Cohen et al. (2005) point out that for managers there is a reduction in the incentive to take higher risk after SOX (Bargeron et al., 2007 65 ). Kang and Liu (2007) find that managers of the firms with better corporate governance and less information asymmetry become more cautious in their investment decisions after enactment of SOX. But there is little research that focuses on the changes in risk taking in the property casualty insurance industry following the implementation of SOX.
Hypothesis Development
This section develops six hypotheses to test the impact of corporate governance and audit quality on the risktaking behavior.
The development of these hypotheses is based on the discussions in Ho et al. 
CEO/chairman duality and risk taking
In serving simultaneously as CEO and chairman, a CEO will likely have greater stature and influence among board members (Harris and Raviv, 1988), thus hampering the board's independent monitoring capacity (Jensen, 1993; Beatty and Zajac, 1994) . Studies suggest that separation of the CEO and chairman of the board helps to align the interests of the directors and stockholders (Kosnik, 1987; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Denis and McConnell, 2003) . Adams et al. (2005) find that firms, in which the decisions are made by a powerful CEO who also holds the position of chairman of the board, exhibit high risk-taking behavior as measured by stock return volatility. The likelihood of either very good or very bad decisions is higher in a firm whose CEO has more power to influence decisions than in a firm whose CEO has less power in the decision-making process. Upadhyay (2008) also finds that CEO/chairman of the board duality is positively related to risk when measured by the standard deviation of monthly stock returns.
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On the contrary, managers that possess decision control may behave in a risk-reducing manner relative to the behavior of owner managers because of management's desire to maximize job security (Amihud and Lev, 1981 67 Zhao and Lehn (2003) find that CEO age is associated with longer tenure. MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990) also note that most consistently risk adverse managers are older. 68 Galai and Masulis (1976) find appreciating value of call option by increasing risk from option price theory. 69 Saunders et al. (1990) 
Percentage of financial experts on the board and risk taking
One of the most controversial SOX provisions requires public companies to disclose to the SEC whether or not they have a financial expert on the audit committee of their board of directors. 73 Under 73 Defond et al. (2005) suggest that financial expertise may be acquired in at least one of four ways: (i) education and experience as a principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, controller, public accountant or auditor, or experience in one or more positions that involve the performance of similar functions; (ii) experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, controller, public accountant, auditor or person performing similar functions; (iii) experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies or public accountants with respect to the preparation, audit or evaluation of financial statements; or (iv) other relevant experience. According to the SEC definition, an "audit committee financial expert" must possess one or more of the this rule, the board of directors determines whether or not the board should include a financial expert as part of the audit committee. Although this is framed as a disclosure rule, pressure from either the investment banking community or shareholders requires many boards to ensure that a financial expert is a member of the audit committee.
The SOX specifies the responsibility of corporate officers for the accuracy and validity of corporate financial reports. Higher percentage of financial experts on the audit committee implies more effective monitoring, improved financial report quality and lower probability for managers to become entrenched. This may lead to high risk-taking behavior. The reason is that financial experts possess a deep understanding of a firm's financial situation and may encourage the management to take higher risk in anticipation of a higher return for a positive net present value project.
Chen et al. (2007) find that financial experts have invested a significant amount of effort in improving individual financial expertise and possess a strong incentive to maintain individual reputation in performing their monitoring role as an audit committee member. This is consistent with the results of prior studies that directors' concern for their reputation results in their ability to serve as effective monitors and their tendency to avoid risk taking (e.g., Fama and Jensen, 1983a). Other literature also argues that job security may result in low risk-taking behavior (e.g., Amihud and Lev, 1981; Belkhir, 2006) . If a board member with financial expertise has concerns with his/her job security, then it will results in low risk-taking behavior. Thus, the relation between percentage of financial experts on the audit committee and risk taking is not clear, suggesting the hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: The percentage of financial experts on the board is not related to risk taking in the property casualty insurance industry.
The SOX implementation effect Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) point out that firms that are less compliant with the provisions of SOX earn positive abnormal returns when compared with firms that are more compliant. 74 The market may believe that greater monitoring in the post-SOX period is value enhancing. Thus, positive relations between ownership structure and abnormal returns would show following criteria: experience actively supervising a principal financial officer, principal accounting officer, controller, public accountant, auditor or person performing similar functions; experience overseeing or assessing the performance of companies or public accountants with respect to the preparation, auditing or evaluation of financial statements and other relevant experience. 74 Higher board score represents higher governance. The score is defined as possessing three or four of the following criteria: existence of independent directors, compensation committee, nominating committee and audit committee.
that the market rewards firms with more effective monitoring (Akhigbe and Martin, 2006 , as a measure of firm capitalization. An insurance company with higher leverage level has higher probability to become insolvent. The leverage is a major concern for all stakeholders.
Independent Variables
We classify independent variables into two categories: major independent variables and control variables. Major independent variables are further categorized into corporate governance variables and audit quality variables. Our corporate governance measure is based on the characteristics that capture several aspects of the firm's governance environment: CEO/Chairman duality, board average tenure and insider ownership. board size is negatively related to the percentage of audit committee members (-0.554 at 1 percent significant level). The LN (NA) is positively related to board size (0.574 at 1 percent significant level). In order to avoid the problem of multicollinearity, variance-inflation factors (VIFs) (Neter et al., 1985) of all independent variables are computed. The VIF values of all independent variables in the regression models are lower than 10 (not tabulated). Hence, the regression results are adversely affected by multicollinearity.
Summary Statistics and Empirical Results

Summary Statistics
[Insert Table 2 here] Table 3 shows the results of difference of means tests for all independent variables before and after the SOX Act. We find that reinsurance ratio significantly increases after SOX Act. It indicates that the insurers tend to hedge underwriting risk by buying reinsurance after SOX Act. The changes in other variables are not statistically significant.
[Insert Table 3 here] Table 4 shows the regression results of underwriting risk on corporate governance and audit quality variables. Model 1 includes corporate governance variables, auditing quality variables and control variables such as board size, the log of net admitted assets and Herfindahl index. Model 2 adds the SOX Act dummy variable to examine the effect of the implementation of SOX. The dummy variable is 1 for years 2003 and 2004, and 0 otherwise. In model 3, the reinsurance ratio replaces Herfindahl index because both variables are negatively and significantly related (-0.913 at less than 1 percent level). Model 4 is similar to Model 2 except that we use reinsurance ratio rather than Herfindahl index.
Regression Analysis
We find board tenure is negatively related to underwriting risk for each of the models. This result rejects Hypothesis 2 and indicates that the board with longer tenure tends to be more conservative in making underwriting policies. This result is consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (1997) that longer board tenures are more likely to lead to reduction in risk taking. We also find the percentage of financial experts on the board is positively related to underwriting risk in all four models. This result rejects Hypothesis 5 and implies higher percentage of financial experts leads to higher underwriting risk. The reason is that financial experts possess a deep understanding of a firm's financial situation and may encourage the management to take higher risk in anticipation of a higher return for a positive net present value project. The results are consistent with agency theory and wealth transfer hypothesis (Saunders et al., 1990) in that high risk taking is consistent with shareholder interest maximization.
For the control variables, we find that firm size is negatively related to risk taking and the result is consistent with those of previous studies ( 76 ). The coefficients of other control variables are not significant.
[Insert Table 4 here] Table 5 shows the effects of corporate governance and audit quality variables on the leverage risk of insurers. We note that the leverage risk is computed by one minus the capital-to-assets ratios of insurers. Saunders et al. (1990) note that capital-to-assets ratio is a measure of financial leverage which is commonly used by regulators and investors. From the results of all four regression models, we find that a higher insider ownership is associated with a higher leverage risk when the insider ownership is in the range between 5 percent 25 percent. However, the insurer's leverage risk will decrease as the level of insider ownership is beyond 25 percent. These results do not support Hypothesis 3 but demonstrate that there is a nonmonotonic relation between insider ownership and the insurer's risk taking behavior as mentioned by Dolde and Knopf (2006) and Gorton and Rosen (1995). For the audit quality variables, both the percentage of audit committee directors and the percentage of financial experts on the board do not significantly influence the insurer's leverage risk. These results show that the hypotheses 4 and 5 we established in section 2 can not be rejected.
For the control variables, the firm size is positively related to leverage risk. This evidence is denoted as the size effect in the literature. In Models 1 and 2 we find that the Herfindahl index is negatively associated with leverage risk. It indicates that an insurer with much diversified lines of business has more capacity to bear higher leverage risk. In Models 3 and 4 we also find the reinsurance ratio is positively correlated to the leverage risk. This result demonstrates an insurer ceding higher percentage of his businesses faces less loss payment in the future and tends to operate in higher leverage level. The coefficients of other control variables are not significant.
[Insert Table 5 here] 76 According to Demers (2003) insurers that reinsure a greater percentage of premiums tend to exhibit a higher level of uncertainty.
Conclusion
This study examines the impacts of corporate governance and audit quality on risk taking. We consider both underwriting risk and leverage risk. Some of interesting findings are summarized below. First, the findings suggest board tenure is negatively related to underwriting risk, but the percentage of financial experts on the board is positively related to underwriting risk. The possible reason is that financial experts possess a deep understanding of a firm's financial situation and may encourage the management to take higher risk in anticipation of a higher return for a positive net present value project. The results are consistent with agency theory and wealth transfer hypothesis (Saunders et al., 1990) The sample consists of 36 property casualty insurers with complete records during the period 2000-2004. STDlossratio is measured as the standard deviation of the loss ratio; loss ratio is defined as the ratio of loss incurred divided by premiums earned. Leverage is measured by one minus capital-to-assets ratio. Duality is a binary variable, 1 = the CEO and chairman of the board is the same person, 0 = otherwise. Btenure is defined as average number of years that directors have served on the board. Insider is defined as shares held by executive directors divided by the outstanding shares. Audit member is defined as the percentage of audit committee members. Financial expert is defined as the percentage of financial experts on the board. Bsize is defined as total number of directors on the board. LN(NA) is the logarithm of net admitted assets. Herfindahl Index = Σ(PW/TPW) ^2, where PWi is the value of written premiums in line i (i = 1,2,…,34), and TPW is the insurer's total written premium. Reinsurance is measured as the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premium written plus reinsurance assumed. Reinsurance 1 ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% Bsize is defined as total number of directors on the board. LN(NA) is the logarithm of net admitted assets. Herfindahl Index = Σ(PW/TPW) ^2, where PWi is the value of written premiums in line i (i = 1,2,…,34), and TPW is the insurer's total written premium. Reinsurance is measured as the ratio of reinsurance ceded divided by the sum of direct premium written plus reinsurance assumed. ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10% ***significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
